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Shar┆虎a, Islamism and Arab support for democracy 
Dr Lars Berger/University of Leeds 
 
Abstract:  
The Arab Spring and its aftermath reignited the debate over the relationship between 
Islamism and democracy. This analysis improves upon previous research by demonstrating 
the crucial contribution which a more precise understanding of the multiple meanings of the 
concept of Shar┆虎a can have on our assessment of the future of democracy in the Arab world. 
While support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws has a positive impact on the preference for 
democracy, the insistence that Shar┆虎a represents the word of God as opposed to the human 
attempt to interpret it reduces support for democracy. These findings are of considerable 
significance for academics and policy-makers interested in the future of democracy in the 
Arab world as it suggests that generic expressions of support for Shar┆虎a are less relevant in 
explaining support for democracy than what Arab women and men consider to be its essence. 
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The Arab Spring renewed academic interest in the question of whether Islamism and 
democracy are compatible.1 Irrespective of whether one views pro-democracy attitudes as 
helping to bring about democracy2 or to sustain existing democratic political orders3, it is 
clear that democracy in the Arab world has no future without robust popular support. The 
following analysis thus builds on previous scholarship which examined possible determinants 
of support for democracy4 to offer the most in-depth and comprehensive examination yet of 
how different interpretations of Islam help explain support for democracy in the Arab world. 
More specifically, it improves on earlier analyses by utilizing independent variables which 
are more precise in capturing the essence of the Islamist political program by distinguishing 
the Islamist insistence on interpreting Shar┆虎a as the word of God5 from the general public 
support for Shar┆虎a as a symbol of good governance6. This improvement in the specification 
of crucial independent variables sets the foundation for the academically and politically 
significant finding that it is not general support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws, but 
whether or not people accept Shar┆虎a as the product of human agency which constitutes an 
obstacle to the wider embrace of democracy.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The insistence on the implementation of a political order based on ‘Islamic Law’ features 
prominently in the Islamist political program.7 The question arises whether this vision can be 
reconciled with the demands of a robust democracy. A cording to Stepan and Linz8, there is 
not a single Muslim-majority democracy which has established S ar┆虎a as its legal code. In 
some of the countries under consideration here (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya), Shar┆虎a is mostly applied in family law. In Sudan, elements of penal law are 
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based on Shar┆虎a. At the other end of the spectrum, Tunisian political elites embraced the 
notion of a ‘civil state’.9 An-Nahda’s re-interpretation of Shar┆虎a from a set of legal norms to 
a set of moral values and the movement’s support of Tunisia’s new constitution despite it 
only referring to the ‘teaching of Islam’ and not ‘Islamic law’10 suggests one way of solving 
the possible tension between the strong support for Shar┆虎a and democracy across the Arab11 
and wider Muslim world12.  
While the understanding of Shar┆虎a as a fixed set of laws which only need to be implemented 
by political authorities might be central to how Western Orientalists, Islamists and some 
authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world interpret Islam13, it does run counter to the 
existence of a multitude of interpretations of Shar┆虎a throughout Muslim history14. Otto, for 
instance, differentiates between ‘divine, abstract’ Shar┆虎a, ‘classical’ Shar┆虎a, ‘historically 
transferred’ Shar┆虎a, and ‘contemporary’ Shar┆虎a.15 As these terms suggest, they all differ 
with regard to the involvement of human agency. The widely shared understanding that 
‘divine, abstract’ Shar┆虎a encapsulates ‘God’s plan for mankind’ comes closest to the notion 
of an ‘unchanging’ Shar┆虎a.16 Recognizing the need to translate the abstract norms of ‘divine’ 
Shar┆虎a into specific guidelines, Muslim scholars spent the first two hundred years after the 
death of Prophet Muhammad producing what Otto labels ‘classical’ Shar┆虎a’.17 As a product 
of human interpretation, it reflected the political, social, and religious conditions of its time. 
Otto therefore argues that the ‘classical’ Shar┆虎a of the first two hundred years of Islam’s 
history, the ‘historically transferred’ Shar┆虎a as it developed over the following millennium 
and ‘contemporary’ Shar┆虎a are all products of human activity and thus better understood as 
fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence.18 This distinction has crucial implications for the extent to 
which support for Shar┆虎a can go hand in hand with a genuine commitment to democracy. If 
Shar┆虎a is treated as fixed ‘Islamic’ law, then this would seriously curtail the ability of the 
people and their representatives to freely pass laws as is the case in a democracy. It is this 
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unease with the notion of people’s sovereignty which led 20th century Islamist thinkers to 
regard the demands of ‘God’s law’ and democracy as irreconcilable.19 For Sayyid Qutb, the 
choice was clear: ‘Either divine law, or human whim.’20 However, as Al-Azmeh pointed out, 
this rigid interpretation of Shar┆虎a ignores its abstract nature which, as originally understood, 
‘does not designate law, but is a general term designating good order, much like nomos or 
dharma’ which made general calls for its application ‘meaningless’.21 As Hallaq put it,  
 (i)n order for the term ‘law’ to reflect what the Shari‘a stood for and meant, we 
 would be required to effect so many omissions, additions, and qualifications that we 
 would render the term itself largely, if not entirely, useless.22  
So how did this notion of a fixed set of ‘Islamic laws’ emerge? As various observers23 have 
pointed out, it was during the process of (post-) colonial state building across the Muslim 
world during which Shar┆虎a was turned from a ‘transcendent, divine source of law interpreted 
by scholars’ into a ‘set of rules defined and applied by authority of the state’.24 For Feldman, 
the call to implement Shar┆虎a should thus be viewed as a response to the ‘constitutional 
defect’25 of unfettered post-colonial authoritarianism. Reflecting its symbolic function ‘as a 
guarantee of stability and justice that is at the same time “authentic”’26, Muslim women and 
men nowadays often see the implementation of Shar┆虎a as an instrument that helps facilitate 
ethical conduct and good governance as well as the fight against corruption and economic 
inequalities.27 That is why large numbers of Muslims support Shar┆虎a in principle while 
disagreeing over what this should mean in terms of practical implementation.28 Rediscovering 
the original meaning of Shar┆虎a as divine guidance, which, through the exercise of people’s 
sovereignty, still needs to be translated into specific laws would help marry the widespread 
demand for political adherence to ‘Islamic’ values29 with the notion of people’s sovereignty 
as a central ingredient of democratic political systems.  
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These theoretical arguments find some initial support in existing evidence for the tension 
between support for the strict implementation of Shar┆虎a and support for democracy. 
Moaddel30 for Saudi Arabia as well as Hoffman and Jamal31 for Egypt and Tunisia found 
preference for democracy to be negatively correlated to support for the notion that only 
Shar┆虎a should be implemented. In the context of Pakistan, on the other hand, Fair, Littman, 
and Nugent32 showed that those respondents who associated Shar┆虎a implementation with the 
provision of social services and security for the people were more likely to support 
democratic governance. This suggests that the direction of any correlation between support 
for Shar┆虎a and democracy might quite strongly depend on what respondents perceive Shar┆虎a 
to be. The present analysis is the first to offer a broad comparative investigation of this 
question in the Arab world. It thus tests the following main hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Support for the Shar┆壱a compliance of laws correlates with lower support for 
democracy. 
Hypothesis 2: Support for the notion that Shar┆壱a constitutes the word of God correlates with 
lower support for democracy. 
Closely connected to the Islamist demand for the implementation of a supposedly fixed set of 
Islamic laws is the question of whether the resulting political system would be able or willing 
to protect the rights of religious minorities and women33 or transcend instead into some kind 
of illiberal democracy.34 Islamist rhetoric on the issue of religious freedom traditionally 
focused on the concept of Dhimm┆ which applies to followers of other monotheistic religions, 
predominantly Christians and Jews, as fellow people of the book (‘ahl ul-kitダb’). At the time 
of its development by classical scholars, the status of Dhimm┆ offered a level of protection of 
life, property and religious practice, which was generous when compared to the general 
treatment of the ‘religious other’ in medieval Christian Europe.35 This status does, however, 
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fall short of modern notions of equality and tolerance as ‘(f)reedom from persecution is 
different from freedom for social and political mobility.’36 Again, the distinction between 
Shar┆虎a as a set of divine norms and fiqh, which, as Jurists’ law, cannot claim divine status, is 
crucial.37 As Kraemer observed with regard to freedom of religion, the notion that conversion 
from Islam is punishable by death only emerged within fiqh, i.e. the human attempt to 
interpret the will of God.38 While the Qur’an does describe apostasy as a sin, it does not 
proscribe a specific punishment.39 Hadiths which do appear to proscribe a specific 
punishment are, in Kraemer’s view, of debatable quality.40  
A similar pattern emerges with regard to the question of women’s rights. Traditional 
interpretations of what Otto41 would term ‘classical’ or ‘historically transferred’ Shar┆虎a insist 
on the dependence of women on the ‘guardianship’ of men similar to those of minors.42 
Muslim feminists stress, however, that these traditional interpretations merely reflect the 
patriarchal biases of the time of their codification and fail to adhere to the egalitarian essence 
of Islam, which emphasized gender equality.43 All of this explains why the differentiation 
between the view of Shar┆虎a as the word of God and Shar┆虎a as the human attempt to interpret 
the word of God is so crucial. Only in the latter case is it possible to reconcile Shar┆虎a with 
modern notions of human and women’s rights, which lie at the heart of a functioning 
democracy.44 In other words, if ‘divine’ and human sources of Shar┆虎a are appropriately 
differentiated, possible tensions between Shar┆虎a and democracy begin to dissipate. The 
following analysis thus tests the assumption that a respondent’s view of Shar┆虎a correlates 
with their willingness to support religious freedom and gender equality as set out in figure 1. 
Figure 1 here 
The possible interaction between views of Shar┆虎a and support for religious freedom and 
gender equality also matters since the latter form part of a broader set of ‘pluralist’45 or 
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‘emancipative values’46 which are strongly linked to the development of effective democracy. 
As Milligan, Andersen, and Brym pointed out,  
 tolerance of minority rights prevents the formation of a tyrannical majority, ensuring 
 that the interests of all citizens are respected to a degree.47 
For Rowley and Smith48, it is this unease with religious freedom which explains the 
democracy deficit in Muslim-majority countries. The following analysis therefore tests 
Hypothesis 3a: Support for the Shar┆壱a compliance of laws correlates with lower support for 
democracy through reduced support for religious freedom. 
Hypothesis 3b: Support for the notion that Shar┆壱a constitutes the word of God correlates 
with reduced support for democracy through reduced support for religious freedom. 
Similarly, Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel49 as well as Inglehart and Norris50 demonstrated that 
gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization, but is part of a broader cultural 
change which increases demands for democracy. In their pooled analysis, Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, 
and Meyer51 showed that in non-Arab Muslim societies support for gender equality and 
democracy were indeed positively correlated, but that the relationship was negative in Arab 
societies. They thus suggested that in the Arab world, women might prefer to work within the 
constraints of the existing authoritarian regimes out of concerns over what the democratic 
empowerment of Islamists might mean for women’s rights.52 This interpretation found 
support more recently in Kostenko, Kuzmuchev and Ponarin’s analysis of first wave Arab 
Barometer data according to which only 17% of respondents supported b th democracy and 
gender equality.53 By contrast, Ciftci54 showed that support for gender equality helped predict 
support for democracy in the Arab world. This raises the question of whether views of 
8 
 
Shar┆虎a have an indirect association with support for democracy via their link with views of 
gender equality as outlined in figure 1. 
Hypothesis 4a: Support for the Shar┆壱a compliance of laws correlates with lower support for 
democracy through lower support for gender equality. 
Hypothesis 4b: Support for the notion that Shar┆壱a constitutes the word of God correlates 
with lower support for democracy through lower support for gender equality. 
 
Data and Method 
This analysis makes use of data collected via the third wave of the Arab Barometer project. 
Most of the interviews took place between December 2012 and July 2013 (with the exception 
of Kuwait and Libya where surveys took place in March and April 2014). Results of earlier 
waves of the Arab Barometer have been utilized in important research referenced above.55
The current data set offers a number of advantages over earlier data sets. First, it covers the 
largest number of countries representing more than 82 percent of the Arab world’s total 
population. With twelve countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen) surveyed, it goes beyond the ten countries 
covered in the second wave and the seven countries covered in the first wave. These countries 
offer considerable variety in terms of experiences with democracy and the political influence 
of Islamist movements. In light of this diversity, robust cross-country findings would increase 
confidence in the applicability of the underlying pattern to the wider Arab world. 
Second, the data set is more comprehensive in terms of the inclusion of theoretically 
important variables. Earlier analysis did not test for the impact of support for Islamism56 or 
support for political gender equality57. Most crucially, the present data set features, for the 
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first time, a variable which captures respondents’ views on whether or not they think that 
Shar┆虎a constitutes the word of God. Previous analyses on the impact of support for Shar┆虎a
relied on a measure of generic support which did not contain information on what 
respondents thought Shar┆虎a’s essence to be58 or only asked whether respondents viewed 
Shar┆虎a primarily as a symbol of good governance or system of hudd┣d punishments.59 
Third, the current data is the result of fieldwork conducted when the Arab Spring’s political 
ascendancy of Islamist movements had reached its short-lived peak. In early 2013, the 
Muslim Brotherhood controlled presidency and parliament in Egypt, the Tunisian an-Nahda 
party and the Moroccan Justice and Development party had secured pluralities of seats in 
their countries’ parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Development 
Party had won 17 out of 80 seats reserved for parties in Libya’s 2012 elections, and the Green 
Algeria Alliance had secured 49 out of 462 seats in Algeria’s 2012 parliamentary elections.60 
The present analysis is thus able to capture views of democracy among supporters of the 
Islamist political agenda at a time when the idea of their leaders exercising political power 
was not merely a distant vision, but political reality. In other words, the timing of the 
underlying survey allows us to test whether the exercise of political power had moderated or 
even improved views of democracy among supporters of Islamist movements. 
The present analysis, run in STATA, is similar in its empirical strategy to earlier analyses61 in 
employing ordinary least squares regression on samples covering Muslim respondents. It 
does, however, go one step further by developing simultaneous effects models. This approach 
helps test whether views of Shar┆虎a and the political role of Islam do not just impact support 
for democracy directly, but also, as outlined in hypotheses 3a-b and 4a-b, indirectly by 
influencing support for religious freedom or gender equality which previous research 





Existing research on public support for democracy in the Arab world often relied on the 
rudimentary measure of support for the notion ‘Democracy may have its problems but it’s 
better than any other form of government’, which was sometimes combined into an index 
variable with another question measuring general approval of having a democratic political 
system in the respondent’s country.62 Critics of this approach63 argued that simply measuring 
generic support for ‘democracy’ is misleading as this could simply reflect ‘lip service’64 
which lacks a ‘truly exogenous effect’65 on democracy. Welzel66 as well as Norris and 
Inglehart67 thus developed a democracy-authoritarianism index which subtracted ‘support for 
army rule’, ‘approval of experts, not politicians making decisions’, and ‘support for strong 
leaders who do not have to bother with parliaments and elections’ from support for 
democracy. While the third wave of the Arab Barometer does not contain specific questions 
on support for the rule of army or technocrats, it does contain a question about authoritarian 
rule similar to the one which Norris and Inglehart68 utilized. The following analysis thus 
utilizes as its dependent variable a subtractive index which subtracts support for a ‘political 
system with an authoritarian president who is indifferent to parliament’ (Question 517.2, 
Arab Barometer, table II, appendix) from support for a ‘democratic political system that 
ensures public freedoms, equality in political and civil rights, devolution of authority, and 
accountability and transparency of the executive authority’ (Question 517.1, Arab Barometer, 
table I, appendix). This dependent variable resembles the Democracy-Authoritarianism index 
which Inglehart and Welzel69 and Inglehart and Norris70 showed to be a much stronger 
predictor of a society’s actual level of democracy than any of the questions which simply 
probed general preference for democracy. 
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A second, quite common, approach has been to combine the general preference for 
democracy with views on its performance.71 This approach has been criticized by Norris and 
Inglehart72 who emphasized the need to differentiate between the general support for 
democracy and views on its specific performance. As Inglehart and Welzel argued, ‘there are 
a large number of people who support democracy for reasons of expected performance.’73 
Esmer74 thus differentiated between views on possible problems with democracy such as 
weak economic performance, indecisiveness, or the inability to maintain order on the one 
hand and views on possible alternatives to democracy on the other. Ciftci75 adopted a similar 
approach when he differentiated between a ‘diffuse’ support for democracy, as measured in a 
general preference, and ‘specific’ support for democracy, as measured in views on its 
performance. A factor analysis of the present data confirmed the appropriateness of the 
approach adopted by Ciftci76 and Esmer77. Views on the performance of democracy, which 
explained 39.4 percent of the variance, and the general preference for democracy, which 
explained 17.0 percent of the variance, constitute two distinct dimensions (table III, 
appendix).78 The following analysis thus incorporated a robustness check which followed 
Ciftci79 and Esmer80 in constructing a separate dependent variable out of the items listed in 
table III of the appendix which measure vi ws on democracy’s performance with higher 
values indicating greater confidence in the capability of democracies to generate economic 
growth, make decisions and maintain order.81 This approach addresses Hofman’s concern 
that the inclusion of questions about general preferences for democracy, strong rulers or 
military rule might ‘underestimate the support for democracy in nations undergoing 
democratization, especially when this process is tumultuous.’82 In a second robustness check, 
views on the question of whether democracy is appropriate for the respondent’s country 
(table IV, appendix) were utilized as the dependent variable. It offers a useful complement to 
the other two dependent variables as it encourages respondents to directly situate support for 
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democracy in the specific political and economic context of their country. In both cases, the 
results of the main analysis were confirmed (table VIII, appendix). 
 
Independent variables 
Existing studies of the impact of support for Shar┆虎a on attitudes toward democracy83 or 
economic equality84 made use of a question probing support for the statement that ‘(t)he 
government should implement only the laws of Shar┆虎a.’ The following analysis utilizes a 
more comprehensive measure of support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws to test hypotheses 
1, 3a, and 4a. It combines responses to the statements ‘government and parliament should 
enact laws in accordance with Islamic law,’ ‘government and parliament should enact penal 
laws in accordance with Islamic law,’ ‘government and parliament should enact personal 
status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law’, and ‘government and 
parliament should enact inheritance laws in accordance with Islamic law,’ so that higher 
values indicate greater support (Cronbach’s Alpha .830). In order to test hypotheses 2, 3b, 
and 4b, a separate variable is employed which measures support for the view that ‘Shar┆虎a is 
the word of God’ (coded ‘1’) as opposed to ‘Shar┆虎a is the human interpretation of the word 
of God’ (coded ‘0’). 
In addition to usual control variables such as gender, education, and income, the following 
models also contain further controls capturing the possible impact of additional views and 
interpretations of Islam. Tessler’s85 earlier factor analysis had already demonstrated the 
existence of a personal dimension of religion which covers prayer, religious observance, and 
the use of religion when facing important problems on the one hand and a political dimension 
which covers views on the political role of religious leaders and general Islamic guidance in 
public affairs on the other. In addition, Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins86 found that questions on 
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whether it would be better to have more religious people hold public office and on whether 
men of religion should play a role in government decision-making effectively capture support 
for Islamism. These questions offer the advantage of directly capturing agreement with the 
idea of the twin toleration of political and religious elites.87 As Stepan had argued, without 
this ‘twin toleration’ of democracy and religion, where a country’s ‘religious authorities do 
not control democratic officials who act constitutionally’ and ‘democratic officials do not 
control religion as long as religious actors respect other citizens’ rights’, neither can 
flourish.88 The sceptics’ view that Islamists might simply use democracy as an instrument of 
gaining power was encapsulated in the warning by President Clinton’s first Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Edward Djerejian, th t ‘one man, one vote, one 
time is not democracy’.89 In contrast to such scepticism, existing public opinion research 
unearthed some overlap between support for democracy and the support for a political role of 
Islam in the Arab world.90 Other studies found the negative impact of Islamism to be limited 
either to female respondents in the case of a question about support for a role of Islam in 
economic affairs91 or to respondents in non-Arab Muslim countries92. Ciftci’s93 examination 
of 3rd wave Arab Barometer data did, by contrast, show that respondents who supported the 
notion that men of religion should influence government decisions were less likely to support 
democracy in Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, and Yemen. The following analysis utilizes an index 
variable which builds on Ciftci94 as well as Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins95 and Tessler and 
Gao96 in operationalizing Stepan’s97 ‘twin toleration’ concept via the combined support for a 
public role for religious people and for religious elites influencing government decisions 
(tables V and VI, appendix). The potential impact of individual religiosity is measured via an 
index variable combining frequency of prayer, attendance at religious services and Qur虎ダn 
reading.98 Factor analysis (table VII, appendix) conducted on the present sample confirms 
that views on the applicability of Shar┆虎a (31.8 percent of variance explained), individual 
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religiosity (14.7 percent), support for a political role of Islam (12.8 percent), and the view 
that Shar┆虎a is the word of God as opposed to the human attempt to interpret it (10.0 percent) 
load onto four distinct dimensions which warrant the inclusion of four separate independent 
variables.99  
Hypotheses 3a-b are tested via a question asking respondents whether they (strongly) 
(dis)agreed with the right of ‘religious minorities such as Christians and Sh┆虎a to practice 
their religion freely’. Hypotheses 4a-b are tested via a measure of gender equality which 
follows the approach taken in earlier assessments of Arab and Muslim support for 
democracy.100 It combines into an index variable support for the right of married women to 
work outside the home with the rejection of the notion that men make better political leaders 
than women and that university education is more important for men.  
 
Analysis 
Results reported in table 1 make it abundantly clear how crucial the distinction is between 
support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws and the insistence that Shar┆虎a constitutes the word 
of God.101 Contrary to hypothesis 1, support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws increases, not 
reduces, support for democracy irrespective of model specification (table 1, models 1-3). This 
finding reaffirms earlier qualitative102 and quantitative103 studies insofar as support for the 
Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws should not be understood as support for an Islamist political 
program, but rather an expression of support for an instrument that is seen as facilitating 
ethical conduct104 or a just social and political order which reflects Islamic values105 more 
generally. It reflects the fact that roughly half of all Arab supporters of democracy follow an 
instrumentalist interpretation of democracy which emphasizes fighting corruption and 
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furthering social justice over a procedural interpretation which emphasizes rights and 
freedoms (table IX, appendix).106 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The positive impact of support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws contrasts quite starkly with 
the negative impact which the insistence that Shar┆虎a constitutes the word of God has on 
support for democracy. In line with hypothesis 2, respondents who follow this viewpoint are 
less likely to prefer democracy over authoritarianism (table 1, model 3), to view the 
performance of democracy positively and to regard democracy as suitable for their own 
country (table VIII, appendix). In short, this variable is the only variable capturing various 
interpretations of Shar┆虎a and Islam’s political role which consistently correlates with public 
opinion on democracy across the Arab world. It thus becomes clear that it is not the widely 
shared preference for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws that is problematic, but the Islamist 
insistence on the unchanging nature of Shar┆虎a. 
There is also considerable evidence for the hypothesized indirect effect of views of Shar┆虎a on 
support for democracy as they interact with support for religious freedom and for gender 
equality as the two only variables which, in line with earlier research107 onsistently help 
predict support for democracy (table 1, models 1-3). What the present analysis adds to these 
earlier findings is concrete evidence that these two crucial dimensions of pro-democracy 
attitudes are themselves shaped by different conceptions of Shar┆虎a and views on the political 
influence of Islam. Again, the distinction between support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws 
on the one hand and the insistence on Shar┆虎a as the word of God on the other hand is crucial. 
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Contrary to hypothesis 3a, support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws increases support for 
religious freedom across the three models. The impact of views on the essence of Shar┆虎a, 
however, points into the opposite direction. In line with hypothesis 3b, respondents who think 
that Shar┆虎a is the word of God are less likely to support religious freedom (model 3). 
Hypothesis 4a on the negative association between support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws 
and support for gender equality finds some supporting evidence in models 1 and 2. However, 
when views on the essence of Shar┆虎a are added to the model (model 3), the association loses 
its statistical significance. As predicted in hypothesis 4b, it is the insistence on Shar┆虎a 
constituting the word of God which now emerges as a significant negative predictor of 
support for gender equality. This finding would not surprise Muslim feminist voices who had 
long argued that the notion of a ‘fixed’ Islamic law constitutes a significant obstacle to the 
empowerment of Muslim women.108 The gendered nature of the debate over the meaning and 
essence of Shar┆虎a comes into even clearer focus when we compare the results of our model 
across male and female samples. While views on the essence or applicability of Shar┆虎a have 
no impact on support for gender equality among women, they both clearly reduce support 
among men (table X, appendix). Further research thus appears to be warranted into the 
possibly different ways in which Muslim women and men conceive of and interpret the 
essence and applicability of Shar┆虎a. 
A number of control variables exert noteworthy direct and indirect influence on support for 
democracy. In line with earlier research109, support for a political role of religious elites 
reduces support for democracy both directly and indirectly via reducing support for religious 
freedom and gender equality (table 1, models 2-3). This finding serves to illustrate how 
crucial the twin toleration of religious and political spheres as set out by Stepan and Linz110 
will be if democracy has any hope of survival in the Arab world. 
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The impact of religiosity is felt mostly at the level of our mediator variables. Here, the 
interaction with views on the essence of Shar┆虎a as well the political role of Islam is 
noteworthy. Once these variables are added to our model, religiosity emerges as a positive 
predictor of support for religious freedom and ceases its significant negative correlation with 
support for gender equality (table 1, models 2 and 3). In other words, from a rights 
perspective, individual religiosity is only problematic if it goes hand in hand with a literalist 
approach to religious sources and the demand for a greater political role of religion. 
Women do not differ from men in their views on democracy and religious freedom. They are, 
however, more likely to support gender equality, which, as mentioned above, is strongly 
correlated with greater support for democracy (table 1, models 1-3). In light of the 
international media’s attention on the younger generation’s role in the early stages of the 
Arab Spring, it might come as a surprise that age has a positive direct impact on preference 
for democracy as well as a consistent positive indirect impact as it increases support for 
religious freedom and gender equality (table 1, models 1-3).111 Analysis reported in the 
appendix (table X) reveals an interesting pattern. While younger women are weaker in their 
preference for democracy, young Arab Muslim men are particularly reluctant to protect the 
rights of women and religious minorities. Here, we might witness the concern among young 
Muslim women over the possible impact of an Islamist-led democracy on their personal 
rights and freedoms.112 
Finally, education exerts the expected influence as it strengthens the preference for 
democracy and increases support for religious freedom and gender equality (table 1).113 This 
finding aligns with earlier evidence on the positive relationship between education and 
support for democracy from Central Asia114 and Africa115. It offers further confirmation for 
the robustness of the link between education and support for democracy irrespective of the 





This analysis has demonstrated the need to carefully distinguish the general support for the 
Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws from the insistence that Shar┆虎a constitutes the word of God when 
assessing support for democracy in the Arab Muslim world. Just like the rejection of the twin 
toleration of religious authorities and political office-holders, the insistence that Shar┆虎a 
constitutes a set of clearly defined laws, which represent the word of God as opposed to the 
human attempt to interpret God’s message, is linked with a weaker preference for democracy 
and lower support for religious freedom and gender equality as crucial safeguards of effective 
democracy. It is thus no coincidence that the only successful transition toward democracy 
occurred in Tunisia where Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of the formerly Islamist an-Nahda, 
announced his party’s departure from Islamism and the embrace of the label Muslim 
democrat.117 
The fact that much previous analysis was unable to detect a strong negative association 
between Islamist ideology and support for democracy suggests that any future examination of 
this relationship must be careful to utilize and construct dependent and independent variables 
which offer precise measures of support for Islamism and democracy. First, as has been 
pointed out before118, support for democracy can be most meaningfully measured if it is 
combined with a measure of support for authoritarian alternatives. Second, any attempt to 
measure support for Islamism needs to include a question on respondents’ views on the direct 
political influence of religious authorities. Only such a measure is capable of appropriately 
depicting support for what Stepan and Linz119 described as the twin-toleration of religious 
authorities and political elites without which democracy cannot succeed. 
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The strong negative impact on views of democracy of support for a political role for Islam 
and a literalist interpretation of the meaning of Shar┆虎a contrasts starkly with the positive 
impact of support for the Shar┆虎a-conformity of laws. This suggests that just like democracy 
itself, for many Muslims across the Arab world, Shar┆虎a does connote good governance. 
Wider academia as well as, most crucially, policy-makers in the West need to understand that 
in the context of social desirability and Shar┆虎a’s perceived ability to address widespread 
social problems, the expression of a generic support for Shar┆虎a is not an appropriate measure 
of support for the Islamist political project. Support for Shar┆虎a only becomes problematic 
when combined with an exclusivist interpretation of its essence. The question which divides 
supporters and opponents of democracy in the Arab world is not whether laws should follow 
the ethical guidance contained in Islam’s founding message, but whether a fixed corpus of 
‘Islamic laws’ already exists and only requires implementation, as stipulated by some 
Islamist movements and authoritarian governments desperate for religious legitimacy.120 This 
flexibility regarding the meaning of Shar┆虎a would also make the embrace of modern notions 
of religious freedom and gender equality easier to obtain. Such reconceptualization is crucial 
as support for personal freedoms and emancipative values lie at the heart of effective 
democracy121 as evidenced yet again in their strong positive impact on support for democracy 
in our models. This analysis has demonstrated that this link continues to persist even in the 
context of the upheaval of the Arab Spring. The considerable, yet far from overwhelming, 
support which gender equality and a separation between religion and politics enjoy in the 
Arab world serves as a reminder that the region is not as inescapably hostile to effective 
democracy as the disappointments of the post-Arab Spring in Egypt, Yemen, Syria and 
elsewhere might suggest. Those among the international community interested in supporting 
democracy in the region could thus make a profound contribution towards increasing the 
chances of success of any future political transitions by helping to protect Arab supporters of 
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gender equality and religious freedom who seek to develop less literalist and exclusivist 
interpretations of Islam from the attempts by authoritarian governments and radical Islamists 
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Table 1 – Simultaneous Effects Model:  
Arab Views of Democracy (3rd Wave Arab Barometer) 
 
 Model 1   Model 2  Model 3   
 B Std. E. B Std. E. B Std. E. 
Shar┆虎a Word God     -0.083** 0.026 
Religion & Politics   -0.077*** 0.008 -0.074*** 0.008 
Support Shar┆虎a Law 0.038*** 0.005 0.045*** 0.005 0.045*** 0.005 
Religious Freedom  0.184*** 0.013 0.179*** 0.013 0.173*** 0.014 
Gender Equality  0.087*** 0.006 0.081*** 0.006 0.081*** 0.006 
Women -0.070** 0.023 -0.049* 0.024 -0.044 0.024 
Age 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 
Education 0.063*** 0.013 0.063*** 0.014 0.060*** 0.014 
Income -0.012 0.013 -0.012 0.013 -0.017 0.013 
Religiosity -0.008 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 
Algeria 0.169** 0.059 0.145* 0.062 0.156* 0.063 
Egypt -0.034 0.055 -0.081 0.056 -0.061 0.058 
Iraq 0.186** 0.054 0.234*** 0.055 0.244*** 0.056 
Jordan -0.342*** 0.049 -0.319*** 0.050 -0.296*** 0.051 
Kuwait -0.656*** 0.056 -0.634*** 0.057 -0.641*** 0.058 
Lebanon 0.267*** 0.066 0.198** 0.067 0.197** 0.069 
Libya -0.213*** 0.054 -0.266*** 0.056 -0.236*** 0.057 
Morocco 0.198** 0.057 0.205** 0.059 0.240*** 0.061 
Palestine -0.507*** 0.053 -0.491*** 0.054 -0.479*** 0.055 
Sudan 0.158** 0.054 0.205*** 0.055 0.228*** 0.056 
Tunisia 0.184** 0.056 0.181** 0.057 0.212*** 0.059 
Constant 2.964*** 0.113 3.220*** 0.119 3.275*** 0.122 
 
Religious Freedom       
Shar┆虎a Word God     -0.041* 0.018 
Religion & Politics   -0.053*** 0.006 -0.053*** 0.006 
Support Shar┆虎a Law 0.019*** 0.003 0.026*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.004 
Women 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.007 0.017 
Age 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Education 0.060*** 0.010 0.055*** 0.010 0.056*** 0.010 
Income -0.023* 0.009 -0.021* 0.009 -0.023* 0.009 
Religiosity 0.002 0.004 0.008* 0.004 0.008* 0.004 
Algeria -0.817*** 0.042 -0.831*** 0.043 -0.830*** 0.044 
Egypt 0.717*** 0.039 0.668*** 0.040 0.700*** 0.041 
Iraq 0.536*** 0.038 0.540*** 0.039 0.542*** 0.040 
Jordan 0.301*** 0.035 0.318*** 0.036 0.342*** 0.036 
Kuwait 0.497*** 0.040 0.520*** 0.041 0.538*** 0.041 
Lebanon 0.868*** 0.046 0.809*** 0.047 0.806*** 0.048 
Libya -0.143*** 0.039 -0.173*** 0.040 -0.157*** 0.041 
Morocco 0.225*** 0.041 0.225*** 0.042 0.257*** 0.043 
Palestine 0.439*** 0.038 0.443*** 0.039 0.464*** 0.039 
Sudan 0.103** 0.039 0.119** 0.039 0.147*** 0.040 
Tunisia 0.480*** 0.040 0.463*** 0.041 0.493*** 0.042 
Constant 2.359*** 0.073 2.474*** 0.074 2.513*** 0.076 




Shar┆虎a Word God     -0.130** 0.039 
Religion & Politics   -0.209*** 0.012 -0.207*** 0.012 
Support Shar┆虎a Law -0.046*** 0.007 -0.018* 0.008 -0.013 0.008 
Women 1.003*** 0.034 0.997*** 0.035 0.998*** 0.036 
Age 0.004** 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.004** 0.001 
Education 0.218*** 0.021 0.197*** 0.021 0.196*** 0.021 
Income 0.027 0.020 0.035 0.020 0.030 0.020 
Religiosity -0.031*** 0.008 -0.013 0.008 -0.014 0.008 
Algeria 1.105*** 0.089 1.145*** 0.093 1.196*** 0.095 
Egypt 0.518*** 0.084 0.319*** 0.085 0.349*** 0.088 
Iraq 0.141 0.082 0.169* 0.083 0.196* 0.085 
Jordan 0.352*** 0.076 0.377*** 0.076 0.414*** 0.079 
Kuwait 0.357*** 0.086 0.430*** 0.087 0.467*** 0.089 
Lebanon 1.511*** 0.100 1.271*** 0.100 1.342*** 0.104 
Libya 0.253** 0.084 0.135 0.085 0.174* 0.088 
Morocco 0.831*** 0.088 0.761*** 0.090 0.825*** 0.093 
Palestine 0.262** 0.082 0.293*** 0.083 0.325*** 0.085 
Sudan 0.365*** 0.084 0.419*** 0.084 0.416*** 0.086 
Tunisia 1.111*** 0.087 1.057*** 0.087 1.136*** 0.090 
Constant 7.573*** 0.156 8.045*** 0.159 8.029*** 0.165 
Log Likelihood -195890.82  -205732.7  -204147.71  
LR chi2 123.63  81.22  79.72  
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
N 11414  10890  10480  
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